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Abstract of
APPLYING FOR ENTITLEMENTS:
EMPLOYERS AND THE TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit is probably the most outstanding example
of a generous entitlement program with very low participation rates. Only
about 10 percent of eligible youth are claimed. The causes of the low
participation rate were analyzed by estimating a poisson model of the number
of TJTC eligibles hired and certified during 1980, 1981 and 1982. Information
costs, both fixed and variable, were found to be key barriers to TJTC
participation. The cost effectiveness of TJTC is low because the stigma and
recruitment costs of hiring additional TJTC eligibles are very high. Employers
find it relatively cheap to passively certify eligible new hires who would
have been hired anyway so this mode of participating in TJTC predominates.
1APPLYING FOR ENTITLEMENTS:
EMPLOYERS AND THE TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT
Between 1979 and 1985 firms that hired eligible disadvantaged individuals
were eligible for a tax credit that equaled one half of the first $6000
wages paid in the first year of employment and one quarter of such wages
in the second year. The eligible target groups were handicapped
individuals, welfare recipients and economically disadvantaged youth,
Vietnam veterans and ex-offenders. Between 1981 and 1985, the number of
targeted individuals who were hired and determined to be eligible
(certified) ranged between 200,000 and 586,000 annually. Large as these
numbers may seem, they were only a small fraction of the total numbers
of eligible individuals hired during this period. The Congressional Budget
Office has estimated that Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) helped less than
10 percent of the eligible young people who were hired during 1983
(Christensen 1984). Furthermore, the companies that participated in TJTC
in 1982 accounted for only about 4 percent of the nation's employers and
less than 20 percent of the nation's jobs. Seventy-three percent of the
employers in a 1982 survey who had some familiarity with the program said
they did not plan to ask the employment service for TJTC eligible referrals
when they needed unskilled workers in the future.
Low take up rates for targeted hiring subsidies are not a uniquely
American phenomenon, for European efforts to subsidize the employment of
particular target groups have also had low participation rates (Schmid,
1981) . Low take up rates have also occurred for other tax subsidies.
The 1954 revision of the income tax code allowed firms to use accelerated
depreciation schedules on all new investment but 6 years later only 21
percent of all proprietorships and 30 percent of all corporations were
using an accelerated depreciation method on any component of their capital
stock (Ture, 1967).
Why did the employer community turn such a cold shoulder on such a
generous subsidy entitlement? Clearly, the expected costs of learning
about and participating in this program must, for most firms, have been
larger than the expected benefits of participating. What are these costs?
Has, as Bishop and Haveman (1979) suggested, TJTC's highly targeted nature
2stigmatized the workers it was designed to help? What implications do
high nonpecuniary costs of participation and the resulting low participation
rates have for the policy analysis of programs, like TJTC, which subsidize
activities considered to be in the public interest such as hiring the
disadvantaged or increasing R & D spending? These are the questions
addressed in the paper that follows. The next section develops a very
simple Poisson representation of employer participation in TJTC. The extent
of participation is analyzed as an outcome of a comparison of the expected
tax benefits of participating against the fixed and variable costs of
learning about the program and participating in it. This model generates
a number of predictions regarding which employers will be the heaviest
users of TJTC and how these patterns will change over time. Section 2
presents the results of the analysis of data from a large scale employer
survey on the use of T JTC . Section 3 examines whether most of the employers
participating in the program are active users who try to increase their
hiring of eligibles or whether they passively seek tax credits for people
they would have hired even in the absence of the tax credit. Section 4
focuses on the effects of the stigma attached to being a TJTC eligible
on the use and the effects of the program. Section 4 summarizes the
empirical findings, discusses some options for reforming TJTC and then
draws some conclusions regarding how prospective policy analysis should
proceed in the future.
I. Model Specification
Bishop (1982), Ashenfelter (1983) and Moffitt (1983) have shown that
the low rates of participation in many income maintenance programs can
be explained by models in which participation stigmatizes the individual
or entails other significant nonpecuniary costs. On the surface it might
appear that decisions to participate in the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit are
very different from decisions to participate in income tested transfer
programs. Since employers make the participation decisions, factor demand
theory rather than utility theory is relevant. In T JTC, the person who
decides whether to participate and who receives the subsidy is not
stigmatized by participation. It is the eligible job applicants who are
stigmatized. The potential tax credit is very much larger than the payment
3a poor family can receive from welfare so incentives to learn about the
program would appear to be stronger. Nevertheless, nonpecuniary costs
of participation are the primary reason why participation rates are so
low. While they arise for dilIerent reasons, their structure is rather
similar to the structure assumed by Moffitt's (1983) analysis of welfare
participation. Nonpecuniary costs depend on both the fact of participation
and on the extent of participation and the decision maker is able to change
behavior in ways that increase the receipt of subsidy. And, as a result,
the costs of TJTC participation affect employer behavior--lowering
participation rates and reducing incentive effects--in much the same way
that stigma affected individual behavior in Moffitt's analysis of welfare.
We will return to these similarities in section 3 of the paper.
The nonpecuniary costs of participating in TJTC derive largely from
the fact that it subsidizes the hiring of groups of workers who are both
hard to identify and generally thought to be below average in productivity.
The use of family income and receipt of welfare as targeting criteria means
that government must certify whether each individual is eligible. Even.
if the firm has already hired eligibles, participation entails learning
about the program, establishing a relationship with the administering agency
and applying for certification of new hires thought to be eligible. Since
September 1981, it has been necessary to apply for certification prior
to the first day of work. The costs of passive participation--obtaining
tax credits without changing how many eligibles are hired-"'-are both fixed
(Cp) and variable (cp per eligible certified). Assuming homothetic
technology and no TJTC induced change in the rate of turnover of targeted
labor (t), in the growth rate of the establishment (g) and in who is hired,
passive participation is preferable to nonparticipation if:
1) Net Benefitsp = NBp = (SW - cp)(g + t)To - Cp ) O.
where W is the wage of target group labor, S is the rate of subsidy (0
if the firm has no tax liability) and To is the number of eligible workers
employed in the base period.
The objectives of TJTC are realized only if firms respond to the
incentive effect of the subsidy by increasing the hiring of targeted
4workers. But such active participation is more costly than passive
participation. These additional costs are to some degree fixed (Co.) for
an increase in the hiring of eligibles necessitates a shift of recruitment
efforts to labor market intermediaries that can refer eligibles and! or
the development of a mechanism for screening all job applicants (not just
those hired as in passive participation) for eligibility for TJTC. Giving
hiring preference to those found eligible is costly as well. Prior to
TJTC, asking job applicants whether they were a welfare recipient or
disadvantaged was generally thought to be illegal, so people from
stigmatized groups typically obtained jobs without the employer learning
of their disadvantaged status. Even with the help of TJTC, many
disadvantaged job seekers believe, probably correctly, that an early
revelation of their disadvantaged status will reduce their chance of being
hired (Burtless 1985; Moran et al 1982). If only a minority of eligibles
are aware of their eligibility or willing to reveal it, finding additional
TJTC eligibles who come close to meeting the firm's hiring criteria becomes
very expensive. Thus, hiring additional T JTC eligibles may generate delays
in filling openings and result in a higher proportion of the new hires
performing poorly on the job. These variable costs of active participation
are assumed to be a constant amount (Co.) per additional eligible hired.
Whether a firm will choose active participation over nonparticipation can
be judged by comparing the profits obtainable at the effective post-subsidy
wage of (l-S)W+cp+ca after subtracting participation costs and the subsidy
on the previously employed workers to the profits obtainable if the firm
does not participate (Ashenfelter 1978; Montgomery 1982):1. Letting 1T
be the profit function and P be the vector of all other prices, the net
benefits to active participation, NBo., can be expressed as:
2) NBa = 1T(P,(l-S)W+cp+ca.) - 1T(p,W) -Cp -C.,. -(SW-cp-ca)(l-t)To +cp(t+g)To
The firm participates if either (1) or (2) is positive. If (1) is larger
than (2), the number of targeted workers certified is (t+g)T<> and the
employer is termed a passive participant. Otherwise, the number of targeted
workers certified comes from maximizing (2) and the employer is termed
an active participant.
5Hypotheses to be Tested
Obviously a firm will not participate if it has no openings in a job
classification for which subsidy eligible workers might qualify and is
more likely to be a heavy user if it has large numbers of job openings
for unskilled workers. Consequently, the following indicators of the
potential scale of hiring of unskilled workers by the sampled establishment
are hypothesized to have positive effects on TJTC usage:
0 Total employment at the establishment.
0 The growth rate of employment at that establishment.
0 The proportion of the work force in low-skill occupations.
0 The rate of turnover of unskilled workers.
0 The elasticity of demand for unskilled labor.
Firms that have shown a willingness to hire and train the unskilled
in the past face lower incremental costs of active participation (c..) than
other firms. This increases the probability and amount of participation,
so the following characteristics of the establishment are hypothesized
to raise participation:
0 Nonunion firms with flexibility in terminating unwanted workers.
Employers feel that hiring a subsidized worker increases the risk
that things will not work out. If the firm can easily correct a
hiring mistake by firing the worker, the costs of mistakes are
reduced.
0 On-the-job training (OJT) that is general rather than specific.
The turnover rates of TJTC eligibles are believed to be higher than
for other competing workers. If OJT is extensive and specific to
the firm, these higher rates of turnover will impose significant
costs on the firm and raise the marginal cost of participation.
If training is general and workers pay for the training, higher
turnover rates will not be a serious problem.
0 Below average starting wage rates: The marginal costs of participation
will be lower because the firm will already be accustomed to providing
the additional training that TJTC eligibles might require.
0 Employers contacted by Employment Service officials offering to refer
T JTC eligibles.
0 Employers who have used the Employment Service in the past.
Only one indicator of the incremental costs of passive participation (C:l=J
is in the data set:
60 Proportion of workers who are full-time: Marginal participation
costs are the same for each worker, regardless of the numbers of
hours worked. The subsidy is typically larger for full time workers.
Consequently, the difference between subsidy and marginal
participation costs is greater for full-time workers and incentives
are stronger both to apply for certifications (passive participation)
and to recruit additional eligibles (active participation).
Since lower fixed costs of participation (Cp and Ca.) raise the
probability of participation, establishments with the following
characteristics are hypothesized to be more likely to participate in TJTC:
0 Establishments that are part of a large multiestablishment firm.
Firms that have many establishments spread the fixed costs of learning
how to use the program and revising internal administrative procedures
over many establishments. All other scale variable refer to the
establishment, not the firm.
0 Establishments that have personnel directors. The personnel directors
have more time to learn about programs like TJTC than owners or plant
managers, and they are also more likely to be targeted for outreach
by agencies seeking to place TJTC eligibles.
0 Members of local business organizations. These employers are more
likely to get a "sales pitch" about TJTC at meetings or in a
newsletter.
0 Employers contacted by local program administrators.
0 Employers that have participated in this or similar programs in the
past. Participation in one program teaches the firm how to handle
the paper work and generates contacts which facilitate future use
of T JT C . The experience with eligible workers may also result in
the firm developing more favorable attitudes towards them. A variable
for past participation may also pick up the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity.
0 Employers with a positive attitude toward government.
0 Regular users of the employment service.
Participation is defined as the number of target group members hired
and certified. In the sample of establishments studied about 90% did not
hire and certify any TJTC worker, 5% hired and certified 1 to 5, and the
remaining 5% hired and certified more than 6. Because of the highly skewed
and discrete nature of the distribution, the Poisson specification proposed
by Hausman, Hall, Griliches (1984) is employed.
The model is specified in terms of the establishment's probability of
7hiring and certifying zero, one, two, . . . TJTC workers. The Poisson
distribution gives the probability of nonnegative integer outcomes. The
probability function is given by the following formula:
3) Pr(Ni) = exp(-mi) miNi/Ni! (mi 0, Ni = 0,1,2 . . .)
For instance the probabilities of hiring zero, one, and two TJTC workers
are given by:
Pr(O) = exp(-mi)
Pr(l) = exp(-m,) m,
Pr(2) = exp(-mi) m,2/2
The parameter mj is assumed to be specific to the "i'th employer and
is determined by the employer's characteristics. Specifically it is assumed
that mi is determined by the following formula:
4) log mi = XiB
Xi is a vector of the variables representing the 'i'th employer's
characteristics and B is a vector of coefficients. One of the very
attractive features of the Poisson specification is that the partial
derivative of mi with respect to the 'j'th explanatory variable, Xij, is
5) ~m,/)Xij =~E(N,)/~Xij = bjexp(XjB) = bjE(N,)
where E(Nj) is the expected number of TJTC certifications for the ith
employer. Consequently, when X variables are logs, the bj coefficients
are elasticities of TJTC use. When X variables are categorical or range
between zero and one, bj measures the proportionate response of TJTC
certification to the "j"th characteristic. Estimates of B are obtained
by maximizing the log likelihood function which is written as,
(6)
N
L(B) = 1: (-log N:i! - exp(XiB) + NiX,B).
i="1
II. Results
This section presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the
determinants of TJTC use. The database analyzed is a 1982 survey of 3412
employers designed by staff at the National Center for Research in
Vocational Education and conducted by the Gallup Organization. This survey
was a reinterview of the 1980 Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects employer
8survey. The original sample was a stratified random sample of
establishments (with higher probabilities of selection for large
establishments in low wage industries) paying unemployment insurance taxes
in 10 pilot sites and 18 comparison sites selected for their similarity
to the pilot sites. A complete description of the sample, the survey and
copies of all relevant questions is available in Bishop (1985) and Bishop
and Hollenbeck, (1986). Models were estimated predicting the number of
TJTC eligibles hired and certified in 1980, 1981 and 1982. The definition,
means, and standard deviations of the variables used in the models are
presented in Appendix Table 1 which can be obtained from the authors.
The explanatory variables have been classified into 5 categories: indicators
of the number of job openings at the establishment that could potentially
be filled by eligibles, characteristics of the employer that relate to
the fixed and variable cost of obtaining certifications, measures of
government effort to encourage firms to hire TJTC workers, and the firms'
past experience with government sponsored employment subsidy programs.
Except for the variables that pertain to the previous experience with T JTC,
we do not have yearly observations on the right hand side variables.
The model was estimated separately for each of the 3 years in order
to capture how the employer response to the T JT C program changed over time.
Changes in employer response to the program are to be anticipated because
(1) the program was new in 1979 and many of the employers learned of the
program after 1980, ( 2) response to the program evolves over time as the
firm becomes more familiar with its paperwork and how to recruit and train
members of the target groups, ( 3) the rules of the program changed
significantly in 1981 and (4) efforts of local administrators to promote
the program changed over time. The estimation results are presented in
Table 1.
Indicators of the Number of Job Openings That May Be Filled by Eligibles
The indicators of the number of unskilled job openings during the year
included in the regression are the log of establishment employment in 1980,
the new hire rate in the fourth quarter of 1979, the proportion of the
workers under age 25 in 1979, and the proportion of unskilled workers in
1979. The 1979 values of these variables are used because later values
Variables
TABLE 1
DETERMINANTS OF TJTC HIRING
(Number of Observations = 2,621)
1980 1981 1982
Indicators of the Number of
Log estab. empl. ln 1980
New hire rate in 1979: IV
Proportion under 25
in 1979
Proportion unskilled
in 1979
Indicators of Incremental
Log index of general
training
Log index of specific
training
Unionized
Proportion part-time
Log cost of machine
Wage Residual
Someone fired in 1979
Layoff based on
seniority
Indicators of Fixed Cost
Log firm/estab.
employment
Has personnel office
Member of local busi-
ness organization
Listed opening with
employment service
ln 1979
Outreach
Government office of
eligibility referral
Conversation about TJTC
not initiated by firm
Both a conversation and
a referral offer
Eligibles
0.761*** (26.9)
1.101*** (3.10)
-1.125
0.266**
(.65)
Participation Cost
(2.17)
.280***
- .130*
-.271**
-.237
-.075***
-.347***
.144*
.111
-.071
-.120
.310***
-.503***
2.467***
.626***
-.937***
Previous Receipt of Subsidies
New jobs tax credit .376***
WIN in 1977, 78, or 79 .122
CETA-OJT in 78 or 79 .614***
(7.49)
( 1. 79 )
(2.37)
( 1. 28)
(3.86)
(3.57)
( 1. 83 )
( .98)
(2.08)
( 1. 43 )
(4.17)
(6.92)
(20.9)
(3.74)
(5.18
(4.31)
( 1. 04 )
(6.23)
.855*** (31. 63)
3.139*** (11.48)
1.113***
-.195*
.218***
-.318***
.409***
-.284*
-.103***
.051
.233***
-.191*
.083***
.201*
.006
-.167**
(6.90)
( 1. 70)
(6.12)
(4.71)
(4.00)
( 1. 73)
(5.43)
(.54)
(3.09)
( 1. 80 )
(3.26)
(2.50)
(.08)
(2.49)
1.58*** (18.25)
.358***
-1.019***
.250***
.064
.891***
(3.00)
(7.40)
(2.97)
(.63)
(10.85)
.462*** (12.65)
3.606 (11.66)
.702***
1. 468***
-.106**
-.084
-1.040***
.193
.157***
.162
-.557***
.322**
(3.48)
(9.53)
(2.04)
(.90)
(6.19)
(1.13)
(6.17)
( 1. 22)
(5.60)
(2.23)
.364*** (12.85)
.263*** (2.29)
.146
.467***
( 1. 65 )
(4.78)
.563***
2.204*** (17 .83)
-1. 222***
.928***
.290**
1.092***
(3.06)
(5.82)
(8.62)
(2.16)
(9.06)
t-value in parenthesis
*significant at the 10% level (two sided)
**significant at the 5% level (two sided)
***significant at the 1% level (two sided)
9have been found to be influenced by the extent of participation in the
program (Bishop and Montgomery 1987) and their inclusion in the model would
probably cause simultaneous equations bias.
Since the log of the ratio of firm and establishment emploYment is also
included in the model, the pure effect of establishment size is the
coefficient for establishment size minus the coefficient for log of the
ratio of firm size to establishment size. The difference gives the
elasticity of the number of certified workers with respect to establishment
size while holding firm size constant. The elasticity estimates are 0.83
and 0.78 in 1980 and 1981 but the estimate dropped to 0.10 in 1982.
The new hire rate in the 4th quarter of 1979 had a large positive effect
on T JTC use, as hypothesized. A one percentage point increase in the new
hire rate was associated with a 1% increase in TJTC emploYment in 1980
and a more than 3 percent increase in 1981 and 1982. The share of employees
that were under age 25 in 1979 had the hypothesized large positive effects
on use of TJTC in 1981 and 1982 but inexplicably not in 1980. The
proportion of the firm's jobs that were unskilled (Le., in laborer,
operative, or service occupations) also had the hypothesized positive effect
on TJTC use in 1980 and 1982 but not in 1981.
Indicators of the Incremental Cost of Active Participation
The indicators of low skill, low wages, and lack of job security that
were hypothesized to be associated with low incremental costs of active
participation and therefore with high utilization of TJTC did have the
expected effects on TJTC use in 1980 and early 1981. The big users of
TJTC tended to:
0 offer new employees more than the usual amount of general training
0 offer new employees less than the usual amount of specific training
0 have low capital investment per worker
0 have lower than average wage rates
0 offer less job security (as indicated by having fired someone in
the 4th quarter of 1979
Nonparticipants had the opposite set of characteristics.
After September 1981, however, the pattern changed and the firms that
were big users of TJTC tended to:
10
0 offer new employees less than the average amounts of training
0 be nonunion
0 have high capital investments per employee
0 offer more job security (as indicated by not having fired someone
in the 4th quarter of 1979)
0 layoff workers on the basis of seniority rather than productivity
The results for the post ERTA period support our hypotheses about
unionization but contradict our hypotheses regarding the effect of the
other indicators of participation costs. One can only speculate as to
why indicators of incremental participation costs which had the predicted
effects on utilization in 1980 and 1981 should no longer have such effects
after the ERTA amendments went into effect. The ERTA amendments made two
major changes in TJTC: the blanket eligibility of cooperative education
students was ended and retroactive certifications abolished. The first
change might very well have reduced the training content of the typical
TJTC subsidized job. Since cooperative education placements can be thought
of as low skilled workers being placed in and trained for medium skilled
jobs, another consequence of the decrease in the number of the cooperative
education students getting TJTC certifications might have been a shift
towards firms with predominantly unskilled jobs. This might explain the
big increase between 1981 and 1982 in the response of TJTC hiring to the
proportion of the firm's jobs that are unskilled.
Indicators of Fixed Cost
The results reported in panel 3 of table 1 provide support for the
hypothesis that fixed costs are an important determinant of TJTC use and
that the pattern of fixed costs have substantially changed. Being a member
of a local business organization had a big effect on participation in 1980
but not in later years. Having a personnel office did not increase
utilization at first, but it became important in 1981 and 1982. Probably
the most dramatic change in the pattern of use of TJTC has been the growth
in the use of TJTC by multi-establishment firms. In 1981, establishments
which were part of a chain were less likely to use T JTC. This changed
in 1981 and in 1982 the ratio of firm to establishment employment had become
one of the most important determinants of T JTC use. Apparently, the
managers of the establishments that were part of large corporations were
11
at first reluctant to get involved in TJTC because the tax benefits did
not get passed through to their establishment's profit and loss statement.
In 1981 the corporate staff of many of these companies started to encourage
their local managers to use TJTC and promoted its use by offering incentives
to local managers for hiring TJTC eligibles. Multi-establishment firms
now account for most TJTC certifications. The size of the establishment
is no longer a primary determinant of TJTC usage. Turnover rate, proportion
unskilled or young and the size of the firm (rather than the establishment)
seem to now be the primary determinants of the use of T JTC .
The impact of being a user of the emploYment service during 1979 on
later use of T JTC changed dramatically between 1980 and 1982 as a result
of the ERTA amendments. Government contacts about TJTC and offers of
eligible referrals are positively associated with having listed job openings
in 1979. Holding referral offers constant, listing with the emploYment
service apparently reduced use of TJTC in 1980 but increased it in 1982.
This change is no doubt due to the abolition of retroactive certification
and the resulting greater use of emploYment service referrals to identify
TJTC eligibles prior to hiring. Prior to September 1981, 18 percent of
the TJTC workers known to be eligible when hired were recruited through
the emploYment service. In the 6 months following that date 28.5 percent
were recruited through the emploYment service.
Outreach
Because it lowers the costs of participation, government outreach efforts
should have major effects on TJTC use. The analysis of the first wave
of the employer survey found that firms that first learned of the WIN
program from a personal contact by a representative of a government agency
or local business organization were 84 percent more likely to participate
in WIN during 1979, and 63 percent more likely to participate in TJTC than
firms that had first heard about it from other sources (Bishop and
Montgomery 1986). Having first heard of CETA-OJT from a personal contact
more than doubled the chances of participating in CETA-OJT during 1979.
In the second wave of the survey employers who had heard of TJTC were
asked two questions about government-initiated contacts endeavoring to
promote the TJTC program. The first question was: "Have you or any of
your staff spoken to a representative of government, a trade association,
12
or a local business organization about these tax credits?" If so, they
were asked who initiated the contact? Thirteen percent of the sample of
employers had a governmental official initiate a conversation with them
about TJTC. The second question about government contacts was, "Have you
been asked by the emploYment service or any other agencies to accept
referrals of job applicants who are eligible for Targeted Job Tax Credits
or Work Incentive tax credits?" Twenty-one percent responded that they
had received such a request. Approximately 10 percent reported both types
of interactions.
The coefficients reported in Table 1 measure the expected proportionate
increase in certification of TJTC eligibles induced by each type of
government-initiated contact. Contacts with an employer that include an
offer to refer TJTC-eligible job candidates to the firm had a much larger
impact on TJTC certifications than conversations that promoted the program
but did not offer a referral. The coefficient on the dummy variable
indicating that the government offered to refer an eligible is 2.467.
This implies that making such an offer increases the expected number of
TJTC certifications at that establishment by a factor of 12. In the next
two years the coefficients are positive and highly significant, the point
estimates in 1981 and 1982 are 1.58 and 2.201, respectively.
Previous Receipt of Other Subsidies
As hypothesized, participation in similar subsidy programs prior to
1980 had a large statistically significant impact on T JTC certifications.
The effects of participation prior to 1979 did not diminish with time.
They were even larger in 1982 than they were in 1980. Firms that
participated in all three of the programs prior to 1980 certified 10 times
as many TJTC eligibles as firms that had participated in none.
III . Evidence of the Extent of Active Participation
We now turn to the effects of nonpecuniary participation costs on the
effectiveness of the program? As Moffitt (1983) points out, the effects
of participation costs on labor supply or in this case the hiring of
disadvantaged workers depends on whether these costs are primarily fixed
or variable. From the perspective of the Moffitt model what has been called
fixed costs of active participation (C",) are really variable costs which
13
experience a discrete jump when the firm chooses to consciously increase
its hiring of eligibles. The fixed costs of passive participation (e. g. ,
the costs of learning enough about the program to use it, establishing
a system to identify which new hires are eligible, and risking greater
scrutiny from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Internal
Revenue Service) discourage participation, but for those who do participate,
they should have no systematic effect on the impact of the subsidy on
employment. Consequently, cost effectiveness is not diminished. Employer
characteristics associated with low fixed costs -- membership in business
organizations, a personnel officer, and previous use of the program --
had large effects on participation. But these variables could be proxying
for the fixed and variable costs of active participation as well so this
fact should not be interpreted as favorable news regarding cost
effectiveness.
The variable participation costs are the costs of making arrangements
for the referral of eligible workers, identifying and certifying eligible
workers and the risk of hiring workers who are less productive than the
typical unsubsidized new hire. These costs lower the net benefit of hiring
extra subsidized workers and, therefore, increase the chances the firm
will only passively participate in the program and reduce it's response
when it is an active participant. Since some windfall payments are
inevitable, anything that reduces the behavioral response tends to reduce
cost effectiveness as well. The foregoing analysis provides evidence that
the incremental costs of participation are quite large for many firms.
Various indicators of these costs -- training costs, unionization, the
cost of machinery and willingness to fire, past use of the employment
service and contacts by the employment service offering to refer eligibles -
- had significant effects on participation.
This evidence that the costs of active participation are large suggests
that passive participation may be the predominant form of participation
in T JTC . However, the evidence is by no means definitive. Better evidence
on the issue comes from studying the administrative mechanisms that firms
have established to participate in TJTC. The mechanism that now produces
the great majority of certifications is as follows: employers who believe
that some of their new hires are eligible send a letter to the Employment
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Service requesting certification for each new hire. This letter must be
sent before the new hire begins work but the determination of the worker's
eligibility by the employment service may occur many weeks later. Sometimes
employers make application for everyone they hire. In most cases, however,
the new hires are screened for eligibility by the employer or over the
phone by an outside contractor. This screening generally occurs after
the hiring decision is made. The evidence that screening comes after hiring
comes from two surveys. During the summer of 1985 staff of the National
Center for Research in Vocational Education interviewed corporate, regional
and local managers of 35 large multiestablishment firms in industries that
are heavy users of T JTC. These firms account for about 15 percent of all
T JT C certifications. Those interviews revealed that screening takes place
after the hiring decision in 5 of the 8 fast food chains, 5 of the 7 hotel
chains and 17 of the 20 other firms studied (Hollenbeck 1985).
In many states consulting firms handle the screening and certification
paperwork for more than half of the T JTC certifications. During March
1986 a second series of telephone interviews was conducted with 13 outside
contractors that did TJTC screening and paperwork for the original sample
of 35 firms. Ten of these contractors reported that over 95 percent of
their clients screen for TJTC eligibility after rather than before the
hiring decision. One consulting firm thought a significant number of its
clients were prescreening but could not estimate how many. Another
encouraged its clients to screen prior to making selections and thought
that three-quarters were doing so. The third firm had developed a
proprietary screening procedure that was apparently administered by the
firm prior to the hiring decision. Most of these consulting firms are
apparently marketing systems that greatly simplify passive participation
but which do not appear to stimulate the active forms of participation
which were desired by the designers of the program.
The final bit of evidence on the issue comes from the 1982 survey.
Employers who knew or thought they were hiring TJTC eligibles were asked
directly, "How much did this possibility of eligibility increase the
applicants chances of being hired?" Only 18 percent reported they were
influenced "a great amount" and only 15 percent reported being influenced
a moderate amount. "Not very" was selected by 23 percent and "not at all"
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was selected by 46 percent. In summary, the evidence clearly indicates
that the predominant mode of participation in T JTC is passive.
IV. The Stigma Problem
One of the most important determinants of TJTC utilization is employer
beliefs regarding the productivity of individuals who are eligible for
subsidy. In the survey all employers who had heard of TJTC were asked
if they thought "that tax-credit-eligible people usually make better or
poorer new employees than people who are not tax-credit eligible." Despite
the fact that the socially acceptable response is clearly "don't know,"
"no difference," or "better, 11 28 percent of our respondents admitted to
believing they were poorer than average.
better workers.
A stigma index was constructed assigning +1 for employers who thought
eligibles made better-than-average workers, 0 for those who thought it
made no difference, and -1 for those who thought eligibles made poorer
workers. For non participating firms who answered the question, the
unweighted mean of this stigma index was -.462. The views of participating
employers were less negative. Their unweighted mean on the stigma index
was -.17. Weighting the participants by the number of subsidized hires
significantly raised the average opinion of TJTC eligibles. When weighted
by usage of T JTC, the mean of the stigma index was roughly zero (-.05 and
.04 depending on whether before ERTA or after ERTA usage of TJTC serves
as the weighting factor). There is a strong negative correlation between
stigmatizing beliefs about eligibles and employer use of TJTC. No doubt
these beliefs influence participation. But does participation also
influence these beliefs? It is to this question we now turn.
Only 7 percent said they made
Is TJTC Reducing Stigma?
Since most employers do not know when they have hired someone on welfare
or from a disadvantaged background, they have no empirical basis upon which
to reevaluate their prejudices about these workers, and so the prejudice
is perpetuated. However, when a firm receives a tax credit for hiring
a TJTC eligible, it learns which of its employees are in TJTC target groups.
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As a result it gains an empirical basis for revising its opinions about
target group members. When employers were asked to compare a specific
TJTC eligible they hired to others hired for the same job, the TJTC
eligibles were reported to be just as productive and often more so. This
suggests that among those who use TJTC, prejudices against TJTC eligibles
should diminish over time. While repeated measures of prejudice are not
available to test this hypotheses, we do have repeated measures of T JTC
utilization. The 1982 employer survey also contains data on the success
of a TJTC eligible who was hired in 1980 or early 1981. The impact of
success (or non success) with a previous TJTC eligible on later utilization
of TJTC can therefore be examined.
This was done by reestimating the models in Table 1 with additional
variables representing past use of TJTC and the success of past use of
subsidy programs. The model predicting TJTC certification after September
1981 contains 3 additional variables: a dummy for TJTC participation in
1980, a dummy for TJTC participation in the first 9 months of 1981 and
a continuous variable measuring the relative productivity of a subsidized
worker who was hired in 1980 or the first nine months of 1981. The model
predicting TJTC hiring between December and September 1981 contains two
additional variables: a dummy for TJTC participation in 1980, and a
continuous variable measuring the relative productivity of a TJTC eligible
hired in 1980 or the first 3 months of 1981.
The coefficients on these additional variables are presented in table
2. Not surprisingly, participation in TJTC at one point in time is
associated with greater TJTC hiring in later time periods. Having
participated in 1980 quadrupled TJTC certifications in 1981 and doubled
it in 1982. CertifYing one or more TJTC eligible in the first 9 months
of 1981 multiplies expected TJTC certifications after September 1981 by
6. The coefficients on Favorable Past Experience are positive as
hypothesized and in 1982 statistically significant. The coefficient implies
a modest response of T JTC use to successful past experience with a
subsidized employee. 3 Bishop (1985) found that TJTC eligibles in the retail
and service sector were reported by their supervisor to be an average of
9 percent more productive in the third through twelfth week than
unsubsidized workers doing the same job. A nine percent productivity
TABLE 2
THE EFFECT OF FAVORABLE PAST EXPERIENCE ON FUTURE USE OF TJTC
TJTC Certifications in
1981 1982
Participated in TJTC in 1980 1.307***
(18.3)
.829***
(7.15)
Participated in TJTC in 1981 1.777***
(14.0)
Favorable Past Experience
(subsidized workers relative
productivity)
.042
(1. 49)
.028***
(2.85)
T statistics are in parenthesis under the coefficient. The variables
reported in this table were added to the specification reported in Table
1.
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advantage by an early TJTC hire is predicted by the equation to increase
TJTC hiring by 29 percent in 1981 and 18 percent in 1982.
IV . Summary and Conclusions
In fiscal year 1985 the ratio of TJTC certified new hires to total
private sector employment was only about 0.7 percent while unemployment
was averaging 7 percent. Since many more people are unemployed at some
point during the year than are unemployed at a point in time, it is clear
that relative to the problem it is addressing, TJTC is of quite modest
scale. At such a scale it clearly cannot end welfare dependency and
structural unemployment. Limitations on eligibility and small budgets
do not account for the modest scale of the program, for it is an entitlement
and the pool of potential eligibles is quite large. The low rates of
participation in T JTC by firms that hire unskilled workers appear to be
a consequence of high nonpecuniary costs of participation. Models
predicting which establishments choose to participate in TJTC offer
considerable support for this view. The primary source of the high
participation costs appears to be the complicated eligibility rules which
make it difficult to identify and to recruit eligible disadvantaged workers
and the stigma attached to being a member of TJTC's target groups.
These problems are not solved easily for they are inherent in a targeted
employment subsidy. The very rationale of the program rests on its being
targeted on hard to employ workers. Targeting, however, means that
eligibility certification must be done by government agencies and that
employers are likely to perceive those eligible for subsidy as less
productive than other job applicants. This reduces participation. If
less stigmatizing criteria were used to define target groups, eligibility
would have to be broadened and the program's cost effectiveness would be
reduced.
An important implication of this study is that the magnitude and
structure of participation costs are critical to both the scale and
effectiveness of tax subsidies designed to change firm behavior. A policy
analysis based on a simulation of response based on standard income and
substitution parameters of production and utility theory can be very
misleading. Policy analysis needs to incorporate the administrative and
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information costs involved in running and participating in the program
into the simulations before accurate predictions of the scale and impact
of tax subsidies can be made.
The nonpecuniary cost of active participation--consciously trying to
recruit and hire additional disadvantaged workers--appears to be
particularly high. This suggests that much of the participation that does
occur is probably of the passive variety and thus does not contribute to
the social goal of increasing job opportunities for the disadvantaged.
Stigma is clearly an important reason why employers perceive the costs
of active participation to be so high. Most employers say they have no
plans to ask the employment service for referrals of T JTC eligibles when
they "need to hire unskilled workers" in the future. When asked to explain
why, employers cited the anticipated low quality or inappropriate skills
of the people they expected would be referred. Together with the fact
that the great majority of employers report that they screen for TJTC
eligibility after making the hiring selection, these findings suggest that
the cost effectiveness of TJTC is quite low.
It would appear that TJTC scores very poorly on a static cost
effectiveness criterion. Does it do better from a more dynamic perspective?
If as we speculated in section 4, it were inducing employers to upgrade
their opinions of the productivity of people from targeted groups, the
great cost of the program could be justified. No direct tests of this
hypothesis were feasible in our data but an indirect test -whether positive
experiences with a subsidized worker increases future use of TJTC -- did
yield results consistent with the hypothesis. More evidence is needed
on this issue.
Despite this possibility, it would appear that consideration should
be given to reforming TJTC to increase it's cost effectiveness. One simple
but effective reform would be to make TJTC a marginal tax credit. To
receive a tax credit in 1989, a firm would have to exceed the number of
certifications it obtained in 1987 and only the excess of tax credit claims
in 1989 over claims in 1987 would generate a tax credit. The cost of the
program would decline but the incentive to increase TJTC hiring would
remain. The 1987 tax credit claims would also serve as the threshold in
later years. It should not be updated yearly to reflect the firm's most
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recent use of the program because updating rules substantially reduce
incentive effects and invite strategic behavior which consciously lowers
the hiring of targeted labor in one year to enhance subsidy eligibility
in later years (Bishop and Wilson 1982).
Another alternative would be to drop the employer subsidy approach
altogether and subsidize instead the wages of unemployed disadvantaged
individuals who find and keep a job (Lerman 1982). The employer would
not know whether any of their employees were being subsidized so the stigma
would not affect the employer response to the program. Two randomized
experiments using this approach have found that offering job seekers a
very modest reward for finding and keeping a job has substantial short
and medium term effects on employment and earnings (Rivera-Casale, Friedman
and Lerman 1982; Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987). There is no subsidy scheme
that does not generate windfalls for someone. Probably the most important
difference between a wage supplement and an employment subsidy is who
receives the windfalls. In an employment subsidy, the employers of low
wage workers receive the windfalls. In a wage rate supplement low wage
disadvantaged workers receive any windfalls. They get nothing if they
do not work. The windfall arises when individuals who would have worked
in any case without the wage supplement get higher take home pay as a result
of the supplement.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Note that is has been implicitly assumed that the firm is constrained
from firing all of the low skill workers currently employed and replacing
them with subsidized new hires. Most firms are at least partly
constrained from simply firing workers without apparent cause. This
assumption is reasonable because the training costs for new workers
often exceed the magnitude of the subsidy, and because there have been
as yet no documented cases of experienced workers being fired to hire
a subsidy-eligible worker.
2. Employers who had not participated in the program typically did not
know which of their current employees are eligible for TJTC and may
not even have known what makes a person eligible. Their opinions may
more often reflect prejudice rather than actual experience. Although
the employers who participated in the program typically had a chance
to observe directly how well particular TJTC eligible employees did,
subjective productivity measures are not very reliable so their opinion
is probably some mixture of previous prejudices and recent experiences.
3. The relative productivity of the subsidized employee is the difference
in reported productivity during the 3rd through 12th week between a
specific randomly selected subsidized new hire and the typical new hire
for that job. The scale on which productivity was reported ranged from
zero for absolutely no productivity to 100 for the highest productivity
ever achieved by a worker in the same job. CETA/JTPA-OJT workers were
included among the subsidized workers because it was thought that
positive (or negative) experiences with either program would color
opinions of the other program. The mean of the productivity variable
is 6.7. If we randomly select two of a firm's new hires for a particular
position, the typical magnitude of the difference between the
productivity of these two workers is 15 points. Since the favorable
past experience variable is based on the experience with only one of
possibly many T JTC hires, it is probably measured with a good deal of
error. This should bias coefficients toward zero, so the long run impact
of making successful placements of disadvantaged workers on future
willingness to participate in TJTC is probably greater than that
suggested by the results just reported.
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Composition of Work Force
Unionized .103 .280
Proportion new hires .233 .200
Proportion under 25 .271 .256
Proportion craft .162 .254
Proportion white-collar .470 .360
Proportion managerial .163 .204
Proportion part-time .179 .274
Personnel policies
Has personnel office .115 .319
Log length probationary
period 2.806 1.242
No probationary period .241 .428
Layoff based on seniority .410 .271
Other Firm Characteristics
Log cost of machinery 1.699 1.492
Log weeks to be fully
trained 1.844 1.283
Member of business
organizations .510 .500
Avoids dealing with
bureaucrats .659 .315
Profitable last year .535 .310
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Variable
Employment Size
Log establishment size
Log firm/est. emp.
Standard
DeviationMean
2.912
.490
1.475
1.188
Description
Number of employees plus one
Ratio of firm to establishment employment for
multiestablishment firms.
Collective bargaining coverage of nonsupervisory workers.
Ratio of new hires in 1979 to sum of Dec. 79 emp. and
new hires in 1979.
Proportion work force under 25 in 1980.
Proportion work force that are craft workers in 1979.
Proportion white-collar in 1979.
Proportion managerial in 1979.
Proportion part-time in 1979.
Dummy for respondent worked in the personnel office.
Number of weeks in probationary period.
Dummy for no probationary period.
If there had to be permanent/temporary layoff of one-third
of staff would it be based on seniority or productivity
from one to zero.
Cost of the most expensive machinery the new hire will work
with if purchased today.
Weeks for a new employee to become fully trained and
qualified if he/she has no previous experience.
Firms or respondent a member of a local business
organization.
Responses to "as much as possible I try to avoid having to
bureaucrats" scaled from one to zero.
Responses to "from a profit point of view, was 1981 a very
good year, not a good year, or a year of losses?" scaled
from one to zero.
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APPENDIX
The Poisson Specification
The first derivative of the likelihood is given by
N
~L::: 2: (-Xi exp(XtB) + NiXI),
~B i=l
and the Hessian is
~2L/l1B~B
N
,
::: -z:: XI XI' exp (XIB).
i=l
The log likelihood is globally concave in 8 and so standard nonlinear
maximization routines Yield the MLE of B. Under the Poisson specification,
the expected value of the variance is given by mi, Therefore, a unit
increase in the explanatory variable will influence both the expected values
and the variance of the outcomes. So bj represents relative increase in
the mean and the variance of the outcome in response to the unit change
in the right hand side variable Xij.
Another measure of the impact of the change in firm characteristics
IS the change in the probability of participation. In particular, since
90 percent of the firms do not hire any TJTC workers, it is useful to obtain
the change in the probability of hiring TJTC eligibles. The change in
probability is obtained by differentiating the probability of not hiring
any TJTC worker (Pr(O)) by X and then taking its negative value. The
formula is given by the following:
)Pr (Participation) = Pr(O)
lJx1j
m! bj = APi bj
where APi = Pr(O) m; = fil/exp( fi!)
Since 4P; is a function of fit only, for each value of the probability
of no participation, the corresponding value of ~Pi can be obtained.
The next table shows the values of APi corresponding to various levels
of Pr(O):
Change in Probability of Participation
Pr(no participation) APi
0.95
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.049
0.095
0.179
0.250
0.306
0.347
The marginal effect of the 'j'th characteristic on the probability of
participation is obtained by multiplying APi by bj.
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